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Abstract
The late-Victorian era was characteristed by especially close links between politicians and
￿rms in the UK. Roughly half of all members of Parliament served as company directors, many
as directors of multiple ￿rms. We analyze 467 British companies over the period 1895 to 1904
to investigate the interaction of ￿rms and politicians. We ￿nd that new-technology ￿rms with
politicians serving on their boards were more likely to issue equity ￿nance and had higher Tobin￿ s
Q. Our evidence suggests that causality runs from director-politicians to a ￿rm￿ s performance,
rather than in the opposite direction.
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1I lntroduction
What is the bene￿t of having a politician on a company￿ s board of directors? Politicians may be
placed on company boards to signal to investors that the ￿rm is pro￿table, politicians may be able
to help match the ￿rm with ￿nanciers, or politicians may be able to use their elected position to
in￿ uence public policy in favour of their ￿rms. We analyze an original data set of 467 British ￿rms
between 1895 and 1904 to study the interaction between ￿rm performance and the presence of a
member of Parliament or a member of the House of Lords on the company￿ s board of directors.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on political connections and ￿rm performance in two
ways. While previous studies have generally explored the importance of political connections for
￿rms, no work has yet analyzed if political connections have di⁄erent e⁄ects on young ￿rms in need
of ￿nance, relative to old established ￿rms. We examine the political-￿rm nexus during the period
of the second industrial revolution (1870-1914), to check whether politicians helped (or hindered)
the emerging class of new-technology ￿rms. Politicians could have helped the new-tech ￿rms in
di⁄erent ways. New technologies were not easy for investors to fully understand, which exacerbated
the problem of asymmetric information associated with any credit relationship. In some cases, the
scienti￿c advances were improved production methods. This was especially true for cotton textiles
(the ring spindle and the automatic loom), iron and steel (the use of phosphoric ores), and chemicals
(bleaching powder, fertilizers, and explosives). In other cases, such as electricity, bicycles, dyes,
and the internal combustion engine, completely new products were introduced. In this context even
good entrepreneurs could have faced problems in obtaining external ￿nance, and politicians (with
commensurately high fees) on a board may have signaled a pro￿table ￿rm with a good production
process, thereby raising its market value. In addition, politicians may have been able to obtain
external ￿nance (from banks or the stock market) for the ￿rm they directed, and/or they may have
been able to smooth the passage of favourable legislation (or hinder unfavourable legislation) in
Parliament. Although all ￿rms may have bene￿ted from political connections, it is probable that
new-tech (i.e., second industrial revolution) ￿rms faced greater problems of asymmetric information,
start-up ￿nance, and an uncertain regulatory landscape. Therefore politicians were likely to be of
more use to new-tech ￿rms than to those in the traditional sectors such as railways and breweries.
A second bene￿t is an investigation of the interplay between politics and business in a country
with a strong record of good government, the UK, but which has far more links between politics
2and business than even the most intertwined contemporary economy. We ￿nd 26% of ￿rms in
our sample had either a member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords on their board
of directors, substantially higher than Russia￿ s ￿gure of 12% (the most connected contemporary
economy, see Faccio 2006, Table II). Faccio ￿nds that, at 7.17%, the UK currently has one of
the highest levels of connections between politicians and ￿rms.1 Countries with similar levels of
connections are Indonesia (7.79%), Italy (10.30%), and Thailand (8.24%). Moreover, the UK is
an outlier compared to countries with similar perceptions of corruption and legal heritage, e.g.,
Australia (0.70%), Canada (1.31%), New Zealand (0%), and the U.S. (0.08%).
We assess whether ￿rms linked to politicians were more highly valued on the stock market. We
investigate whether or not politically linked ￿rms were able to issue more equity or debt ￿nance on
the London Stock Exchange, and we perform an event study analysis of the 1895, 1900, and 1906
general elections to see if ￿rms￿share prices were a⁄ected by the election of their directors. It is not
even clear, a priori, that a political connection should be of bene￿t to a ￿rm in Victorian Britain.
Hannah (2007, p. 26) argues that: ￿the ￿ signal￿that attracted the most negative comments was
the appointment of aristocrats or elected members of parliament to boards.￿
Our most signi￿cant result is that politicians on the boards of new-technology ￿rms were asso-
ciated with increased access to external equity ￿nance. In addition, these ￿rms had higher stock
market values than otherwise identical ￿rms did without politicians (which may be due to the
increased access to credit that such politicians provided). Further analysis suggests that causality
most likely runs from directors as politicians to ￿rms￿performances, rather than in reverse.
We attempt to address issues of causality through four approaches. First, we perform an
event study analysis and we check whether the election of members of company boards into the
House of Commons translated into higher share prices. Second, we argue that the endogeneity
of political connections would have had to operate in di⁄erent ways for old- and new-technology
￿rms in order to reproduce the main result of the paper ￿that only high-tech ￿rms were positively
a⁄ected by political connections. Third, we show econometrically that, while the number of political
connections is not random, the observed selection does not appear to be contributing to the results.
In particular, adding more controls in the regressions increases rather than decreases the estimated
impact of political connections. Fourth, the available historical literature suggests that British
politicians did not have particularly good business abilities, therefore they were most likely to be
1Faccio measures the connections of the top ￿ve company o¢ cials, rather than (our measure of) all directors.
3just bringing the company social connections that could have eased the provision of external ￿nance.
We describe our treatment of causality issues in detail in the results section.
There has been much interest in the nexus of politics and business over the previous two decades.
Roberts (1990) shows that the unexpected death of Senator Jackson (Washington), resulted in
negative abnormal returns for ￿rms located in Washington state, and ￿rms which contributed to
his campaign funds. Presumably these ￿rms￿stock prices dropped upon news of the senator￿ s
death due to the abrupt termination of the assistance that he could have continued to provide for
these ￿rms. Fisman (2001) shows that Indonesian ￿rms with connections to the Suharto family
su⁄ered negative abnormal returns upon the dissemination of negative rumours about the health
of President Suharto during the ￿nal years of his presidency. Faccio (2006) ￿nds that the ￿rms
of business-people who are elected to Parliament achieve positive abnormal returns upon news of
their election. Ghita, Cuyvers, and Deloof (2009) shows that there is a positive e⁄ect on a ￿rm￿ s
stock price after it announces that a politically connected individual will join the ￿rm￿ s board.
In a historical context, Ghita et al (2008) examine Belgium over the period 1858-1909 and ￿nd
that ￿rms with politicians on their boards were more likely to survive than non-connected ￿rms.
Ferguson and Voth (2008) show that German ￿rms with connections to the Nazi party experienced
excess returns of ￿ve to eight percent in the months just before Hitler￿ s rise to power.
A Political Connections in Historical Perspective
The turn of the twentieth-century British Parliament was especially connected to the business
world. Slightly more than 40% of all Members of Parliament (MPs) that were elected in 1895 held
at least one directorship at the time of their election (see Table I). MPs elected at the next election,
1900, were even more connected to the business world, and more than half (50.8%) of them held
one or more directorships. These ￿gures are much higher than contemporary ￿gures for the UK
(13.0%) and the US (2.6%).2 For each MP elected in 1895 and 1900 we cross-check the 1895 and
1901 Directory of Directors, to verify if that MP was also a director. The Directory of Directors
lists the titles (e.g., MP, Sir, Right Honourable, Baronet) of directors, which makes the compilation
of the politicians￿business interests straightforward.
2We calculate contemporary ￿gures as the total number of connections (from Faccio, 2006, Table II) divided by
the number of MPs and Lords (UK) and Representatives and Senators (US). Some of Faccio￿ s connections will be
￿ close relationships,￿such as a friendship between a politician and a ￿rm￿ s director, which we do not include.
4The increase in links between business and politics between 1895 and 1900 is fairly large. The av-
erage MP elected in 1900 held 1.29 directorships, compared to 1.08 in 1895. This increase came from
more directorships held by English and Welsh MPs, and the increase was felt in London, provin-
cial cities, and the countryside (see Table I). Most of this increase is due to incumbent politicians
acquiring more directorships during their time in o¢ ce, rather than an especially business-oriented
cohort entering Parliament in 1900. From the 567 constituencies in England, Scotland, and Wales
373 MPs were elected in 1895 and held their seat in 1900. These incumbents held 1.03 directorships
on average in 1895, and by the 1900 election they were seated on 1.41 boards on average. Of these
373 continuing MPs, 213 held the same number of directorships in 1900 as in 1895, while 112 had
increased the number of boards on which they sat, and only 47 had reduced their board positions.
The 1895 and 1900 parliaments were both heavily Conservative, which may be suspected to
upwardly bias the measured level of connections between politicians and ￿rms. In the 1895 parlia-
ment the di⁄erences between the business connectivity of MPs, depending on their party a¢ liation
were large. The average Liberal Unionist member held 1.69 directorships, compared to only 0.78
for the Liberals, with the Conservative MPs in between at 1.15 for each member. However, by
1900 most of this gap had disappeared. Fifty-￿ve percent of all Conservative MPs were directors
(holding on average 1.38 directorships), compared to 48% for the Liberals (average 1.31), and 46%
for the Liberal Unionists (average 1.17).
MPs from London were slightly more likely to be directors and to hold more directorships,
with this e⁄ect most pronounced in 1900. As London was the commercial, ￿nancial, and political
capital this e⁄ect is not surprising. There are few di⁄erences between provincial urban MPs and
MPs elected from rural constituencies. English politicians were more likely to serve as directors
and to hold more directorships on average (53%, 1.37 in 1900) than Welsh MPs (35%, 0.97) or
Scottish MPs (44%, 1.00), although again the di⁄erences are not especially large.
Politicians who were also involved in business was a relatively new phenomenon in the UK in
the late nineteenth century, and, as our ￿gures show, they took to it with gusto. Perkin (1989)
documents that, after 1850, a prolonged fall in the general price level reduced agricultural prices
and rents. Landed gentry started to look at industrial and ￿nancial businesses as a way to diversify
their investments. As a result, it became more and more common to ￿nd aristocrats and MPs on
the boards of industrial companies. For instance, by 1896 there were 167 noblemen, over a quarter
of the peerage, holding directorships, most of them more than in one company (see Thompson,
51963).
The methods by which a company and a titled director matched were various. Often peers
themselves sought to become involved in industrial endeavors. For example, in 1894 Lord Verulam
was the director of two companies, in 1896 six companies, and by 1913 he was the director of
thirteen companies. Serving as director in a ￿rm could have been particularly pro￿table. In
addition to diversifying their own investments, directors received a fee. The sum di⁄ered from
company to company. In the case of Lord Verulam, his annual fees varied considerably, from £50
for the Colchester Brewery Co. to £500 for Accles Borneo Rubber, and in aggregate it yielded a
substantial income in an era where nominal GDP per capita was a little under £50 per annum.
At other times companies searched for a titled director, and a company promoter usually had a
leading role in placing ￿ puppet￿titled directors on company boards. Ernest Hooley was the most
(in)famous company promoter of that era. His technique was to pay members of the aristocracy
to sit on company boards, in order to give his companies the veneer of respectability: the going
rate was £10,000 for a duke, £5,000 for a baron, and so on. It is premature to say that there
was a well-de￿ned market for titled directors, but in the last years of the nineteenth century,
businessmen increasingly realized the importance of portraying business respectability by placing
good sounding names on the board of directors. The late-nineteenth century was not an isolated
period of indiscriminate bonding of ￿rms and politicians in the UK. May (1939) quotes an ad
that appeared in the October 4, 1932 issue of the Daily Telegraph that is suggestive: ￿A titled
gentleman is wanted to communicate with progressive company with a view to installing him as
director. Write A,. Box 10,161.￿
The experience of ￿rms with political directors was often poor. Hannah (2007) claims that
the: ￿fraudulent promoter, Whitaker Wright, used Lord Du⁄erin, the retired Governor General of
Canada, and other gullible peers without business experience, as dummy directors of his London
and Globe Corporation.￿The corporation later collapsed with unpaid claims of over £7 million.
Harrison (1981) states that: ￿the glitter of the prospectus encrusted with the names of aristocrats,
willing to serve as company directors, was a device to attract subscriptions from the public.￿
Entrepreneurs wishing to ￿ oat ￿ good￿companies may have had an incentive to place (expensive)
titled directors on their boards. This could overcome information asymmetry problems between
entrepreneurs and investors and signal that the ￿rm was expected to be successful.
Titled directors may also have represented good relationships with the important ￿nancial
6centres of Britain. They may not have had any particular business ability; in many cases their
main function was the acquisition of ￿nancial capital. In a later period the senior o¢ cial receiver,
H.E. Burgess, provided evidence along these lines (see May, 1939, p. 479): ￿I so frequently ￿nd
[directors] are expert in nothing at all. They merely get a nice-sounding name to put on the
prospectus. They can o⁄er nothing but that name or the acquaintances they have who can be
induced to put up capital.￿
Directors often directly assisted a ￿rm￿ s fund-raising. For example, in the proceeds of the 1899
annual general meeting of the County of London and Brush Provincial Electric Lighting Company,
the vice-chairman (Mr. Braithwaite) was thanked for obtaining: ￿temporary advances from their
bankers, which were obtained on very favourable rates, owing to the state of the money market
and, to a great extent, to the able advice of Mr. Braithwaite.￿ 3 In addition, Harrison (1981) claims
that the New Cycle Company was able to raise £75,000 (three times the amount raised via an IPO)
from: ￿four or ￿ve in￿ uential men.￿
An alternative possibility is that politicians may have instead provided regulatory connections
that helped ￿rms to achieve higher growth rates. This may have been particularly true for electricity
supply ￿rms. Hannah (1979) reports how the allocation of the electricity franchises in the various
districts of London was the result of political struggles between di⁄erent vested interests. In many
instances private electrical enterprises needed the authorization of the local government to expand
their activities and open new power stations. Having a member of the House of Commons or
the House of Lords on the board of directors may have helped electrical ￿rms win such political
struggles and obtain better working terms. This bene￿t may have also been present in old-tech
industries. For example, peers had long lasting interests in railways. The tracks needed to pass
over the countryside, and the old aristocracy was often the landowner. As was the case for railways,
coal and iron mining were activities intrinsically related to the ownership of land: a peer on the
board may have permitted the company to pay lower royalties and have easier access to the mines.
By the beginning of the twentieth century politicians were already criticized for devoting too
much time to their business interests, and not enough time to their constituents and the business
of the nation. In March 1903 in the House of Commons a Mr. Mac Neill made the criticism that:
￿the hon. gentleman in charge of the Treasury Department ... should attend to the duties of his
o¢ ce, instead of the business of his companies ... On February 25 the hon. member attended a
3The Times of London, March 28, 1899.
7meeting of the Westminster Electric Supply Association, and a resolution was proposed asking him
to give his whole time to the company.￿ 4
Potential con￿ icts of interest were apparent during the period under study. The Marquis of
Salisbury argued in the House of Lords in 1900 that: ￿There are directors and directors. There
are directors of the most perfectly innocent kind; directors against whose business it would be
impossible to raise any objection ... On the other hand, there are directors, undoubtedly who are
connected with the Departments of the State, and, as has been pointed out more than once even
of late, one or two of my colleagues have thought it right to retire from the position of director lest
any suspicion should arise.￿ 5
II New Technologies
The years 1870 to 1914 were the years of the second industrial revolution, with many new technolo-
gies discovered. In some cases, the breakthroughs were new equipment or new production methods.
This was especially true for cotton textile, iron and steel, and chemicals that increased the e¢ ciency
of existing production processes. In other cases, such as electricity, bicycles, chemical dyes, and
the internal combustion engine, completely new products were developed. The technologies of the
second industrial revolution were in many respects di⁄erent from the breakthroughs of the late
eighteenth century. Electricity and heavy chemicals were large-scale projects that needed stronger
connections with formal science (see Mokyr, 1999).
These technical characteristics had important implications for the way such projects were ￿-
nanced. They required a high up-front ￿xed cost and a relatively long time before they started to
work properly and deliver revenues. In other words, more than their predecessors, they needed ven-
ture capital. For example, electrical plants were major endeavors requiring money and time before
their successful completion. One example is the building of an electric station in Deptford, London
in 1887 by the London Electrical Supply Company and its prominent engineer, S.Z. Ferranti. The
￿rm had proposed to light two millions lamps in London from a station located along the river
Thames at Deptford, a major undertaking for that period. The ￿rm generated its ￿rst power in
1890 and required a further ￿ve years until it could declare a ￿rst dividend (Shiman, 1992).
4The Times of London, March 5, 1903.
5The Times of London, December 15, 1900.
8The same was true for the new chemical technologies. The ammonia process was complicated,
and its implementation slow and di¢ cult. Brunner Mond, the successful English company produc-
ing alkali with the processes pioneered by Ernst Solvay, took several years before mastering the
product even with Solvay￿ s help (see Lishcka, 1973 and Shiman, 1992).These technologies needed
patient investors committed for a fairly long time to the endeavor.
In contrast, during the earlier stage of British industrialization, ￿nancing needs had been more
modest. As described by Crouzet (1972, p. 164): ￿At the beginning of the [First] Industrial
Revolution, the threshold of entry into ￿ factory￿production was relatively low, especially in the
textile industry, where even the largest production units were small.￿
The ￿nancing of new technologies at the turn of the twentieth century in Britain is a much
debated topic. One view is that banks and investors failed to provide long term ￿nancing and to
establish supportive relations with their industrial clients. Instead investors preferred to ￿nance old
technologies (such as railways) abroad. As a result, entrepreneurial endeavors in new technologies,
such as electricity and chemicals, were discouraged (Kennedy, 1987). An opposing view argues
that Britain did not fail to support new technologies. The open competitive nature of Britain￿ s
markets of the period could hardly sustain incompetence on any signi￿cant scale (McCloskey, 1970).
This view is supported by new evidence that shows that investments abroad were optimal from
investors￿perspectives as they allowed better portfolio diversi￿cation (Goetzmann and Ukhov, 2006,
and Chabot and Kurz, 2010).
III Variables and Data
A Data Sources
The data set consists of 467 British companies for the period 1895 to 1904, corresponding to roughly
2,800 ￿rm-years. The sample covers a wide variety of ￿rms in the manufacturing sector: breweries,
chemicals, textiles, leather and rubber ￿rms, paper and publishing, and iron and steel. We also
consider ￿ve non-manufacturing industries: coal mining, railways, telegraphs, electricity generation,
and electricity distribution.
The sample is not random: all the ￿rms are public, joint-stock companies, that were traded by
members of the London Stock Exchange (i.e. companies that were able to obtain at least some
9￿nancing through regular channels). Some of these ￿rms were o¢ cially listed by the stock exchange
and appeared in the Stock Exchange Daily O¢ cial List with bid and ask quotes. Others were traded
uno¢ cially in London or on provincial exchanges, and ￿nancial details of these ￿rms were reported
by the Stock Exchange O¢ cial Intelligence, an annual publication. Both types of companies had
relationships with banks, and many issued both bonds and stock. If the ￿rms in our sample faced
credit constraints, then private ￿rms would have probably faced even more severe constraints.
The sample is representative of the British industrial structure. The total market capitalization
of the companies in our sample is about £555 million, which corresponds to 25% of the total
capitalization as reported by Moore (2010) and 63% of the London Stock Exchange capitalization
in 1900 (considering only ordinary and deferred shares) according to Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton
(2002).
Accounting data and the names of the ￿rms￿directors were obtained from the original balance
sheets of the ￿rms, as well as the Stock Exchange O¢ cial Intelligence, and the Directory of Directors.
The annual balance sheets of public companies were retrieved from the Guildhall Library, London.
From the accounts it is possible to obtain data such as companies￿debts, physical assets, and
pro￿ts. The balance sheets also report the names of the directors along with their honori￿c titles
and the address of the ￿rm￿ s headquarters It is therefore possible to determine if a director was a
member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords. The balance sheets for electricity supply
and telegraph companies are taken from Garcke￿ s Manual of Electrical Undertakings.
Data on stock prices are obtained both from the Investor Monthly Manual (IMM), a sister
publication of the Economist, and directly from the Stock Exchange Daily O¢ cial List. The IMM
was published between 1869 and 1929 and recorded prices, dividends, and capitalization for railways
and various industrial companies.6 We obtain data on the value of new equity and bonds issued by
￿rms from the IMM columns British Capital Called up During (year) and British Capital Created
During (year).
A large amount of the data employed in this analysis comes from the annual report and the
balance sheet of companies. The quality of information present in published accounts, and public
statements of company o¢ cials during this time in the UK is arguably limited when compared
to present day standards. Arnold (1998) claims that: ￿during the ￿rst quarter of the twentieth
6Data from the IMM are available at the London Stock Exchange Project website:
http://icf.som.yale.edu/imm/index.shtml
10century, ￿nancial accounting practice was only lightly regulated, published accounting statements
contained relatively limited amounts of information and informational asymmetry between senior
managers and the suppliers of long-term corporate ￿nance was material.￿However, other authors
argue that British annual reports at the turn of the twentieth century were generally a reliable
source. Hannah (2007, p. 658) reports that: ￿the great majority of companies published more and
better information than was legally required and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, this was
treated by contemporary investors as broadly accurate.￿Similarly, Sylla and Smith (1995) claim
that Britain had the best quality accounting information in the Western world. Audited accounts
were required by banks from 1879 onwards and by all ￿rms from 1900 onwards (see Hein, 1963). All
the ￿rms￿accounting statements we examine have been certi￿ed by auditors. Auditors were elected
at the AGM (a legal requirement from 1900 onwards). The Companies Act, 1900 required auditors
to certify that the accounts re￿ ected a ￿true and correct view of the state of the company￿ s a⁄airs￿ .
Arnold (1996) summarizes the literature on the quality of corporate accounts in Britain at the turn
of the twentieth century. Citing several studies that compare companies￿private documents with
public accounts, he concludes that: ￿business historians may ￿nd the published ￿nancial statements
of the latter half of the nineteenth century more reliable than they have supposed, although some
caution on their part is still clearly advisable.￿
B Summary Statistics
Table II presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The average ￿rm
had 6.4 directors on the board, of whom 6.5% were politicians. One quarter of all ￿rms had at least
one politician serving on its board. An average ￿rm had been incorporated for almost fourteen
and a half years, and around one-third of our ￿rms were headquartered in London. Two-thirds of
our ￿rms were not o¢ cially listed on the London Stock Exchange. Slightly more than one-third of
our ￿rms were new-technology ￿rms and almost 80% of the ￿rms had paid a dividend during the
previous twelve months. The average ￿rm had a book value of assets equal to £2.6 million. We
do not correct the book value for depreciation or goodwill.7 Firms were quite pro￿table, with a
7Although audited accounts were published by almost every public company, there was no uniform accounting
procedure. In particular, depreciation was an instrument to accumulate secret reserves in good times (by setting it
at a high value) and to increase the stated pro￿ts and distribute dividends in bad times (by setting it at a low value).
Fortunately, balance sheets report the amount of depreciation: the book value of the assets used in the analysis is
the book value of the assets before depreciation.
11return on equity (ROE) of almost 9% p.a. The average ￿rm had been growing at 7% p.a. Growth is
measured as the increase in the book value of a ￿rm￿ s assets plus any dividends disbursed. Although
sales growth might be a better measure of a ￿rm￿ s growth, annual reports rarely report sales data.8
The average Tobin￿ s Q of a ￿rm in our sample is slightly above one.
We ￿nd that 10% of our ￿rms issued some form of capital in the following year to their obser-
vation, and 22% issued capital during the following three years. These capital issues were almost
equally split between equity and debt.
We divide ￿rms into two groups, new- and old-technology ￿rms using a simple procedure. If a
￿rm operated in the chemicals, electricity supply, electricity generation, cycle or motorcar sectors
we classify it as new-tech. All other ￿rms are classi￿ed as old-technology ￿rms (e.g., railways, brew-
eries, textiles).9 We perform this breakdown because previous authors (e.g., Kennedy, 1987 and
Cull, Davis, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, 2006) report that the British capital market had a skepti-
cal approach towards new technologies. It is therefore interesting to study whether novel projects
experienced di⁄erent e⁄ects than did established production processes. We present summary statis-
tics of new- versus old-tech ￿rms in Table III. Unsurprisingly, new-tech ￿rms were smaller, younger,
grew faster, and were less likely to have paid a dividend in the previous year. New-tech ￿rms also
had slightly smaller boards of directors, and were much less politically connected than old-tech
￿rms. Only 5% of new-tech ￿rms had one or more politicians on the board, compared to 27% of
old-tech ￿rms. The values of leverage and Tobin￿ s Q are almost identical between these two types
of ￿rms. New-tech ￿rms were almost 50% more likely to issue capital during subsequent years, in
both equity and debt forms.
We also divide ￿rms into politically connected ￿rms (those with at least one politician on the
board of directors), versus unconnected ￿rms (those with no politicians on the board) in Table IV.
Politicians were more likely to be associated with ￿rms with larger boards of directors (although of
course some of this relation will be mechanical), more assets, and those which were o¢ cially listed.
The average size of a ￿rm with a politician on the board owned assets valued at £8.6 million,
8In a subset of the sample where sales data are available the correlation between sales growth and asset growth is
about 0.6.
9We check company histories and balance sheets to verify the distinction between new and established technologies.
For example, all the textile ￿rms in our sample do not use the (new) technology of the automatic loom. In addition,
we classify United Alkali (chemicals) as an old-tech ￿rm because it was using the LeBlanc process rather than the
newer Solvay process.
12compared to ￿rms without politicians (with assets of £0.5 million). Politically connected ￿rms
were also older (20.6 years vs. 12.6 years) and slightly less pro￿table (ROE of 7.9% p.a. vs. 9.2%
p.a.). Politically connected ￿rms were much more likely to issue capital, both within the next year
(17.1% vs. 8.0%) and within the next three years (31.8% vs. 18.6%).
IV Results
A Access to Financial Markets
A politician can aid a company by providing, hitherto unavailable, access to credit. The politician
may directly loan the ￿rm money (if he is an individual of high net worth), perhaps in￿ uence banks
to extend credit, or just lend his name to the ￿rm￿ s e⁄orts to issue equity or debt on the London
Stock Exchange. Reliable data do not exist to allow us to identify individual loans or bank loans
to a ￿rm. Therefore, we focus on the determinants of funding a ￿rm via the stock exchange, both
equity ￿nance and debt ￿nance. This ￿nance consists of new issues of capital on the market, which
was often o⁄ered pro-rata to existing share and bondholders.
We run a probit regression of whether or not a ￿rm issued any equity security, or any debt
security, in the three subsequent years on ￿rm characteristics. Of our control variables we ￿nd that
larger ￿rms were more likely to issue debt, as were younger ￿rms. Faster growing ￿rms were more
likely to issue both equity and debt, and ￿rms that had paid dividends in the previous year were
more likely to issue equity. In addition, unlisted ￿rms were less likely to issue ￿nance through the
stock market. We include past industry returns in some speci￿cations (the unweighted average of
stock market returns in the previous year for all ￿rms in the same industry) to capture any market
timing e⁄ects. We ￿nd that an industry experiencing strong returns on the stock market induced
￿rms in that industry to issue equity, and we ￿nd the same e⁄ect for debt issues although the e⁄ect
is not statistically signi￿cant.
The e⁄ect of being a politically connected ￿rm (Fraction Politician) appears to have reduced
equity issuance. However, once we add interaction terms we see that unlisted ￿rms with politicians
and unlisted new-tech ￿rms were less likely to issue capital. The triple interaction term indicates
that politicians helped a particular class of ￿rms to issue more funds: ￿rms which were unlisted and
in the new-tech sector. In principle, these are precisely the ￿rms which are most likely to face the
13most severe problems to access ￿nance. As we mention in the historical section, these technologies
had high ￿xed costs and long gestation periods, making their ￿nancing more complicated. The
economic e⁄ects for these ￿rms due to having a politician on their boards are reasonably large.
A one standard deviation increase in Unlisted * New-Tech * Fraction Politician increases the
probability that a ￿rm will issue equity in the next three years by 2.9 percentage points (a 24.1%
rise). Politicians were useful in helping unlisted, new-tech ￿rms (which were likely to be small and
fast growing) to undertake seasoned equity o⁄erings, their e⁄ect on debt issuance is non-existent
to small.10
As a robustness check for our classi￿cation of ￿rms into new- and old-tech we try an alternative
classi￿cation. The alternative uses the capital-labour ratio for that industry using Cain and Pat-
terson￿ s (1981) US data (as far as we know capital labour ratios by industry are not available for
the UK in this time period). The idea is that industries with a high capital to labour ratio (in the
US) are more likely to be new-technology ￿rms, requiring long investment times with somewhat
uncertain production processes. The results are basically unchanged, with the key ￿nding that
unlisted ￿rms with a high capital-labour ratio are more likely to issue equity with a politician on
the board (signi￿cant at the 5% level).
We also test if political connections in￿ uence the value of capital raised by ￿rms: we ￿nd that
this is indeed the case. A one standard deviation increase in the share of politicians on the board of
new-tech companies increases the value of capital raised over the next two years by 14 %, which is
statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. The results are also economically and statistically signi￿cant
when we check over the next year, and over the next three years.11
B Impact on Firm Value
We now turn to the impact of a political connection on a ￿rm￿ s value, measured by the impact on
Tobin￿ s Q in Table VI. The impact on ￿rm value may not be independent of the ￿nancing bene￿ts we
show in Table V, i.e. a ￿rm￿ s value may have changed due to a political connection precisely because
the connection increases a ￿rm￿ s access to credit, which in turn a⁄ects ￿rm value. An alternative
10The triple interaction term remains statistically signi￿cant if past industry returns are included (not shown).
11We also verify if the share of politicians on the board has an e⁄ect on the value of capital issued, conditional on
the ￿rm accessing capital markets. In other words we restrict ourselves to ￿rms that issued equity or debt during our
sample period. The interaction term remains positive, but is not statistically signi￿cant.
14explanation for the same result may be that politicians played a role in signaling a successful new-
tech ￿rm to investors, in other words alleviating a problem of asymmetric information between
entrepreneurs and investors.
We regress Tobin￿ s Q on various ￿rm-level characteristics which have been lagged by one year.
Unsurprisingly, the more pro￿table the ￿rm was (ROE) in one year the higher the value of Tobin￿ s
Q the next year. A larger board of directors was associated with a higher Tobin￿ s Q, although if
we add ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects (not reported) the sign changes. This probably indicates that the relation
is a correlation, rather than a causal one, if the same ￿rm were to add a director there would be
a slight decrease in Tobin￿ s Q. Such a negative correlation between board size and ￿rm value is
also documented by Yermack (1996). However, Yermack even ￿nds a negative correlation without
using ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects, whereas we ￿nd a signi￿cant positive relation. One possibility is that ￿rms
in our sample often had smaller than optimal board sizes (our median board size is 6), whereas
the U.S. ￿rms in Yermack￿ s study from 1984 to 1991 were often over sta⁄ed (with a median board
size of 12). A ￿rm that was unlisted on the London Stock Exchange tended to have a lower value
than a listed ￿rm. The variable politician is negative, and always statistically signi￿cant, which
supports Hannah￿ s (2007) argument. Politicians tended to be associated with ￿rms with a lower
Tobin￿ s Q. However, the interaction of politicians with new-tech ￿rms is informative. Politicians
in new-tech ￿rms were associated with higher values of Tobin￿ s Q (perhaps due to easier access
to ￿nance), although our point estimate is only signi￿cant once we add industry dummies (Table
VI, column 3). If we add ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects the coe¢ cient remains positive, but loses statistical
signi￿cance since there is little variation in political connections at the ￿rm level.
C Endogeneity Concerns
Political connections may have been correlated with the unobserved abilities of the entrepreneurs
and possibly also with ￿rm characteristics. For instance, politicians may have been more likely
to work in e¢ cient ￿rms with high market valuations which were particularly active in issuing
securities. If this were the case, our results would identify a spurious positive correlation between
political connections and security issuance and Tobin￿ s Q. In other words, a ￿rm￿ s performance
would explain the number of politicians on the board, rather than vice versa. We tackle the
endogeneity issue in four ways. While none of our methods can de￿nitively resolve the issue, we
believe that the bulk of the evidence suggests the existence of a causal relationship from a political
15connection to ￿rm performance, rather than the reverse.12
1 Election Results
To investigate if a politician could aid a ￿rm, by dint of his (women were not eligible for election
as MPs until 1918) legislative powers, we perform an event study analysis (see MacKinlay, 1997)
around the general elections of 1895, 1900, and 1906. We study the e⁄ects, on a ￿rm, of a director￿ s
electoral fortunes in the House of Commons general election. The general elections in these years
were all landslides: Conservatives and Liberal Unionists by 234 seats (3.3% of votes) over the
Liberals in 1895; Conservatives and Liberal Unionists by 219 seats (5.6%) in 1900; and the Liberals
by 241 seats (5.5%) in 1906. Therefore the overall outcome should have already been mostly factored
into share prices before the election. However, the results of a particular constituency were much
less predictable, and the results in marginal seats may not have been well predicted pre-election,
given that opinion polls were not used until 1937 in the UK (see King, 2001). Therefore, the result
of a close election (containing a director) in a particular constituency may have had an e⁄ect on the
share price of the director￿ s ￿rm. The direction of the impact is theoretically unclear. An astute
director may have been able to help a ￿rm by his presence in the Parliament (indicating a positive
impact on share prices due to his unexpected election); however, becoming an MP required time
being spent on political events and general governmental duties, and less time available to manage
the ￿rm. Therefore, the election of an astute director may have had a negative e⁄ect on the share
price, if his absence from ￿rm duties was deleterious to the ￿rm￿ s interests.
Election results were released slowly, day after day, in the four weeks that followed the election
day. The slow release is not too critical, since most of the results were available relatively quickly:
36% within three days and 80% within seven days in the 1895 election.13 As a result, we need to
take a longer event window (fourteen days) than is usual in studies of this sort. The long event
window has the advantage that it covers all the relevant disclosures of information, but at the same
time adds more noise to our estimates. A further limitation is that we can only study the e⁄ects
on the share prices of publicly listed ￿rms. Consequently, we focus only on o¢ cially listed ￿rms in
12Exploiting the panel nature of our data, we also performed panel ￿xed-e⁄ect regressions. While the sign of the
interaction term is always positive, we lose statistical signi￿cance. We attribute this result to the fact the proportion
of politicians on companies￿boards is rather constant in our time period. As a result, most of the e⁄ect of the
interaction term New-Tech * Fraction Politician is absorbed by ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects.
13Country and Irish results were the last to come in.
16London, ￿rms whose securities were traded on the ￿ oor of the Exchange for which we have a good
number of bid and ask quotes. We ￿nd 74 ￿rms that had one or more directors that won seats in
the general elections of 1895, 1900, and 1906. We also ￿nd 40 ￿rms in which at least one director
lost his seat. The small sample size does not allow us to make a meaningful distinction between
old- and new-tech ￿rms.
The event study analysis has been performed as follows. For each ￿rm for which we have share
prices, we calculate the abnormal/excess return on ordinary equity from the last Friday before the
￿rst day of the general election to the Friday fourteen days later:
rj;ann = Rj;ann ￿ (b aj;ann +b bj;annRm;ann) (1)
where Rj;ann is the actual return of security j and Rm;ann is the actual return on the market. We
estimate aj;ann and bj;ann with the market model using weekly data between the forty-sixth and
the third week before the election announcement:14
Rj;ann = aj;ann + bj;annRm;ann + ej;ann: (2)
We use the weekly London market index constructed by Braggion and Moore (2011) to calculate
the market return around each announcement date, Rm;ann. We then perform a cross-sectional
regression of ￿rms￿abnormal returns on various electoral characteristics of the ￿rms (see Table
VII).
Firms that had at least one director elected to the House of Commons experienced excess returns
about 1% higher than ￿rms that had no o¢ cials elected in the four weeks following the election
day (Table VII, columns 1 and 2), signi￿cant at the 10% level. Firms that experienced at least one
loss experienced excess returns 0.6% less than other ￿rms (Table VII, column 2), not statistically
signi￿cant. Many ￿rms had two or more directors contesting a general election. In column 3 we add
various dummies to capture many of the combinations of electoral results for such ￿rms. We ￿nd
the strongest results for ￿rms which had multiple directors re-elected. These ￿rms outperformed
the other ￿rms by around 1.6% over the event window. The ￿nal result is a study of abnormal
returns in uncontested constituencies. Not all constituencies had two or more candidates standing
for election. For example, in 1900 the Conservatives had 163 MPs elected without a rival candidate.
Since, by de￿nition, the result of an uncontested election is certain, the period around election day
14The results are not sensitive to the choice of the estimation window.
17should not generate abnormal returns. We ￿nd abnormal returns of -0.3%, which is not statistically
signi￿cant.
While the sample of ￿rms with elected o¢ cials is too small to make a meaningful distinction
between new- and old-tech ￿rms, the results broadly support the idea that a director being elected
was associated with a positive jump in the share price of his ￿rm. Gaining (or maintaining) a
political connection was positively viewed by the stock market.
2 Old-tech vs. New-tech Firms
If political connections were endogenous to the performance of the ￿rm, they would have had to
operate in di⁄erent ways for new-tech and old-tech ￿rms to reproduce the key result in the paper,
that political connections increase security issues and increase the market valuations, but only
for new-tech ￿rms. For instance, if politicians had sought to work in very pro￿table ￿rms (with
commensurately high Tobin￿ s Q), they presumably should not have cared whether the ￿rm operated
in the new-tech sector as opposed to the old-tech sector.
Additionally, the past industry returns variable presented in Table V helps to alleviate problems
of endogeneity related to omitted variables. It could be that politicians preferred to work in
companies that performed particularly well (i.e., high returns for investors) in the years preceding
security issuance. If this were the case our variable politicians may identify a market timing e⁄ect
rather than a direct e⁄ect from politicians to the probability of a security issuance. Firms with high
returns in the stock market may have exploited this opportunity to issue capital. When we include
a variable for past industry returns (to control for possible market timing e⁄ects) our results are
little changed, the political variables retain their signs and signi￿cance.
3 Selection on Observables
Although ￿rms￿political connections were not formed randomly, the observed selection does not
appear to be contributing to our results. In particular, adding more controls in the regressions
increases rather than decreases the estimated impact of political connections. It may have been the
case that some unobservable factors (e.g., board acumen, quality of a ￿rm￿ s corporate governance)
were correlated both with having political directors and a ￿rm￿ s propensity to issue capital. In that
case a politician￿ s presence may show up as positively related to capital issuance, not because the
18politician provides any help, but rather because his presence indicates a particularly well run ￿rm
that ￿nds it easy to issue capital.
If this omitted variables problem was present, and if these unobservable variables on ￿rm quality
resemble observable variables, then adding more observable variables should decrease the measured
impact of politicians. For example, if high quality ￿rms were more likely to be headquartered
in London, or present in a particular industry (e.g., railroads with much more complete ￿nancial
disclosure and widely dispersed share ownership), then once we add variables for London HQ and
industry dummies, the e⁄ect of having a politician should disappear (see Altonji, Elder, and Taber,
2005). However, we ￿nd the reverse; adding more control variables increases the measured e⁄ect of
politicians on capital issuance (see Table V, columns 2-5), and on Tobin￿ s Q (see Table VI, column
3). Therefore, omitted variables do not appear to be driving our results.
4 Historical Evidence
Finally, several authors claim that politicians at this time represented, more than anything else,
good relationships with the important ￿nancial centers of the late-nineteenth century and early-
twentieth century Britain. The historical evidence suggests that politicians did not have any par-
ticular business ability; their main function was the acquisition of the ￿nancial capital necessary to
maintain sound business activities (see Hannah, 2007 and Harrison, 1981).
While describing British capital markets in the early-twentieth century, May (1939) reported
that: ￿sometimes a man with good name, knowing nothing about the business and even without
residence in the country, is set up as chairman with the principal duty of reading the annual speech,
which has been written out for him, to shareholders.￿We ￿nd little written evidence that politicians
were hired by ￿rms for their business acumen. Finally, we exclude Baronets from our sample.
Baronets possessed hereditary honours, but were not peers. More importantly, many businessmen
in our period were awarded a baronetcy by the crown after running a successful enterprise. We
exclude Baronets to remove the obvious problem of endogeneity that including them would incur.
V Conclusion
The UK economy at the turn of the twentieth century had many links between politicians and ￿rms.
More than half of all members of the House of Commons held directorships, and these business links
19did not di⁄er markedly by political allegiance. Consequently, many British ￿rms were connected,
in the sense of being directed, by politicians. Politicians were more likely to be associated with
larger, older ￿rms; often the railways had one or more MPs as directors.
We ￿nd evidence that politicians were successful in alleviating credit constraints for unlisted,
new-tech ￿rms. These were precisely the ￿rms that would, a priori, be expected to have had the
most problems in accessing ￿nance through formal channels. In addition, we ￿nd that politicians
were associated with lower stock market valuations (Tobin￿ s Q) for old-tech ￿rms, but higher
valuations for new-tech ￿rms. Finally, we study the results of the general elections of 1895, 1900,
and 1906. We ￿nd that ￿rms which had directors elected experienced positive abnormal returns.
We ￿nd that politicians were able to provide value to some ￿rms and not others. New-technology
￿rms, which tended to be smaller, fast-growing, and less able to access credit through formal chan-
nels, bene￿ted from their political connections. Old-technology ￿rms which had political directors
tended to have a lower share price, and less access to credit.
20References
Altonji, Joseph, Todd Elder, and Christopher Taber, 2005, Selection on Observed and Unobserved
Variables: Assessing the E⁄ectiveness of Catholic Schools, Journal of Political Economy, 113(1),
151-184.
Ardern, Dean, and Maxwell Aiken, 2005, An Accounting History of Capital Maintenance: Legal
Precedents for Managerial Autonomy in the United Kingdom, Accounting Historians Journal,
32(1), 23-60.
Arnold, Antony, 1996, Should Historians Trust Late Nineteenth-Century Company Financial State-
ments?, Business History, 38(2), 40-54
Arnold, Antony, 1998, U.K. Accounting Disclosure Practices and Information Asymmetry during
the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century: The E⁄ect of Book Returns and Dividend Cover,
Journal of Busines Finance and Accounting, 25 (7) and (8), 775-794.
Braggion, Fabio and Lyndon Moore, 2011, Dividend Policies in an Unregulated Market: The
London Stock Exchange, 1895-1905, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
Cain, Louis, and Donald Patterson, 1981, Factor Biases and Technical Change in Manufacturing:
The American System, 1850-1919, Journal of Economic History, 41(2), 341-360.
Chabot, Benjamin and Christopher Kurz, 2010, That￿ s Where the Money Was: Foreign Bias and
English Investment Abroad, 1866-1907, Economic Journal, 547(9), 1056-1079.
Craig, F.W.S., 1974, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1918, Macmillan Press: London
and Basingstoke.
Crouzet, Fran￿ois, 1972, Capital formation in the Industrial Revolution, The Chaucer Press: Bun-
gay, Su⁄olk.
Cull, Robert, Lance Davis, Naomi Lamoreaux, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2006, Historical Fi-
nancing of Small- and Medium-Size Enterprises, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30(11), 3017-
3042.
Dimson, Elroy, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, 2002, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of
Global Investment Returns, Princeton University Press: Princeton.
21Faccio, Mara, 2006, Politically Connected Firms, American Economic Review, 96(1), 369￿ 386.
Faccio, Mara, 2010, Di⁄erences between Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms: A Cross
Country Analysis, Financial Management, 39(3), 905-928.
Ferguson, Thomas and Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008, Betting on Hitler: The Value of Political Con-
nections in Nazi Germany, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), 101-137.
Fisman, Raymond, 2001, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, The American Economic
Review, 91(4), 1095-1102.
Garcke, Emile, Garcke￿ s Manual of Electricity Undertakings, Various issues.
Ghita, Livia, Ludo Cuyvers, and Marc Deloof, 2009, Business Elites, Political Connections and
Economic Entrenchment: Evidence from Belgium 1858-1865 and 1905-1909, Working Paper,
University of Antwerp.
Goetzmann, William, and Andrey Ukhov, 2006, British Investment Overseas 1870￿ 1913: A Modern
Portfolio Theory Approach, Review of Finance, 10(2), 261-300.
Goldman, Ethan, J￿rg Rocholl, and Jongil So, 2009, Do Politically Connected Boards A⁄ect Firm
Value?, Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360.
Hannah, Leslie, 1979, Electricity Before Nationalization, The MacMillan Press: London.
Hannah, Leslie, 2007, Pioneering Modern Corporate Governance: A View from London in 1900,
Enterprise and Society, 8(3), 642-686.
Harrison, A.E., 1981, Joint-Stock Company Flotation in the Cycle, Motor-Vehicle and Related
Industries, 1882-1914, Business History, 23, 165-190.
Hart, P. E. and S. J. Paris, 1956, The Analysis of Business Concentration: A Statistical Approach,
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 119(2), 150-191.
Hein, Leonard, 1963, The Auditor and the British Companies Acts, The Accounting Review, 38(3),
508-20.
The Investor￿ s Monthly Manual, Various Issues.
22Kennedy,William, 1987, Industrial Structure, Capital Markets and the Origins of British Economic
Decline, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, Mass.
King, Anthony (ed.), 2001, British Political Opinion, 1937-2000: The Gallup Polls, Politico￿ s,
London.
Lishcka, Johannes, 1973, Ludwig Mond and the British Alkali Industry, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, Mass.
McCloskey, Donald, 1970, Did Victorian Britain Fail?, Economic History Review, 23(3), 446-459.
MacKinlay, A. Craig, 1997, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 35(1), 13-39.
May Wilfred, 1939, Financial Regulation Abroad: The Contrasts with American Technique, Journal
of Political Economy, 47, 457-496.
Mokyr, Joel, 1999, The Second Industrial Revolution, 1870-1914, in Storia dell￿ economia Mondiale,
Valerio Castronovo, ed., Laterza Publishing: Rome.
Myers, Stuart and Nicholas Majluf, 1984, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when
Firms have Information that Investors do not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2),
187-221.
Moore, Lyndon, 2010, World Financial Markets, 1900-1925, Working Paper, UniversitØ de MontrØal.
Perkin, Harold, 1989, The Rise of the Professional Society, Routledge: London.
Roberts, Brian, 1990, A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal
bene￿ts, American Journal of Political Science, 34(1), 31-58.
Shiman, Daniel, 1992, The Decline of the British Economy in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twen-
tieth Centuries: Organizational Structure and Technological Performances, Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern University.
Thompson, Francis, 1963, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London.
Skinner, Thomas, The Stock Exchange O¢ cial Intelligence, Various issues, London.
23Sylla, Richard and George David Smith, 1995, Information and Capital Market Regulation in
Anglo-American Finance, Michael D. Bordo and Richard Sylla, eds., Anglo-American Financial
Systems, Irwin: New York.
Yermack, David, 1996, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Smaller Board of Directors,
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.
24N 0 1 2 - 4 5 or more mean max
Conservative 322 54.7 17.1 22.4 5.9 1.15 20
Liberal 167 61.1 19.8 16.2 3.0 0.78 7
Liberal Unionist 65 56.9 9.2 20.0 13.8 1.69 16
others 13 76.9 15.4 7.7 0.0 0.31 2
London 59 59.3 11.9 22.0 6.8 1.22 14
Provincial Urban 209 56.5 17.7 20.1 5.7 1.10 16
Counties 292 57.9 17.5 19.2 5.5 1.02 20
England 456 55.5 16.9 21.7 5.9 1.12 20
Scotland 70 61.4 18.6 14.3 5.7 1.04 16
Wales 34 76.5 14.7 5.9 2.9 0.47 6
Universities 7 42.9 14.3 28.6 14.3 1.86 7
All 567 57.3 16.9 19.9 5.8 1.08 20
N 0 1 2 - 4 5 or more mean max
Conservative 312 44.9 24.0 24.7 6.4 1.38 18
Liberal 172 52.9 17.4 22.1 7.6 1.31 15
Liberal Unionist 59 52.5 22.0 16.9 8.5 1.17 10
others 24 70.8 20.8 8.3 0.0 0.38 2
London 59 45.8 23.7 23.7 6.8 1.42 12
Provincial Urban 209 46.9 24.9 21.5 6.7 1.27 15
Counties 292 51.4 19.2 22.6 6.8 1.29 18
England 456 46.9 22.6 23.2 7.2 1.37 18
Scotland 70 55.7 20.0 20.0 4.3 1.00 5
Wales 34 64.7 14.7 14.7 5.9 0.97 10
Universities 7 57.1 14.3 28.6 0.0 0.86 3
All 567 49.2 21.7 22.4 6.7 1.29 18
1895
Table 1 - Directorships of Members of Parliament (1895, 1900)
We present data on the directorships held by MPs at the time of their election in 1895, 1900. N is the number of 
politicians, 0 is the percentage of MPs who do not hold any directorships, 1 is the percentage holding only a single 
directorship, and so on. Mean is the average number of directorships held by the MPs, max is the maximum number 
held by MPs. Others includes all MPs not listed by Craig (1974) as belonging to the Conservative, Liberal, or Liberal 
Unionist parties.
1900Mean Median s.d. Observations
Board Size 6.44 6 3.62 2845
Fraction Politician 0.07 0 0.13 2845
Any Politician 0.26 0 0.44 2845
Firm Age 14.70 10 13.83 2845
London HQ 0.38 0 0.48 2845
Unlisted 0.67 1 0.47 2845
New Technology 0.37 0 0.48 2845
Dividend Payer 0.79 1 0.41 2731
Firm Size (£, millions) 2.63 0.27 11.58 2845
Return on Equity 0.089 0.073 0.121 2845
Past Growth 0.067 0.054 0.112 2252
Cash over Assets 0.07 0.04 0.10 2845
Tobin's Q 1.12 1.04 0.41 980
Issued any security in the next year 0.10 0 0.31 2845
Issued any security in the next 2 years 0.17 0 0.37 2845
Issued any security in the next 3 years 0.22 0 0.41 2845
Issued ordinary equity in the next year 0.04 0 0.21 2845
Issued ordinary equity in the next 2 years 0.08 0 0.27 2845
Issued ordinary equity in the next 3 years 0.11 0 0.32 2845
Issued bonds in the next year 0.04 0 0.20 2845
Issued bonds in the next 2 years 0.08 0 0.27 2845
Issued bonds in the next 3 years 0.10 0 0.30 2845
Table II - Summary Statistics, 1895-1904
Board size is the number of directors. Fraction Politicians is the number of directors who were
MPs or Members of the House of Lords divided by the number of directors for that firm. Any
Politician equals 1 if there is at least one titled director on the board, and 0 otherwise. Firm age
is the number of years since incorporation. London HQ is equal to 1 if the firm's headquarters
are in London, and 0 otherwise. Unlisted is equal to 1 if the firm was not officially quoted on
the London Stock Exchange and 0 if it was. New Technology is equal to 1 if the firm was in
the electricity, chemicals, bicycle or car sectors. Dividend Payer is equal to 1 if the firm paid a
dividend in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Firm size is the book value of assets, in
millions of pounds. Return on Equity is profits divided by paid up equity. Past growth is the
book value of assets in period t plus dividends paid less the book value of assets in period t-1
divided by the book value of assets in period t-1. Cash over Assets is cash divided by the book
value of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by
the book value of equity plus the book value of debt. Issued any security in the next year is
equal to 1 if the firm issued any form of debt or equity on the London Stock Exchange in the
following year, and 0 otherwise, and similarly for 2 and 3 years. Issued ordinary equity is equal
to 1 if the firm issued any ordinary equity, and 0 otherwise. Issued bonds is equal to 1 if the
firm issued any debt security, and 0 otherwise. Each observation is a firm-year.Mean Median s.d. Observations Mean Median s.d. Observations
Board Size 5.94 6 2.39 1065 6.75 6 4.15 1780
Fraction Politician 0.05 0 0.11 1065 0.07 0 0.14 1780
Any Politician 0.05 0 0.11 1065 0.27 0 0.45 1780
Firm Age 9.16 7 8.38 1065 18.01 13 15.31 1780
London HQ 0.42 0 0.49 1065 0.35 0 0.48 1780
Unlisted 0.70 1 0.46 1065 0.65 1 0.48 1780
Dividend Payer 0.74 1 0.44 1032 0.82 1 0.38 1699
Firm Size (£, millions) 0.52 0.21 1.04 1065 3.90 0.32 14.47 1780
Return on Equity 0.087 0.071 0.103 1065 0.090 0.073 0.131 1780
Past Growth 0.082 0.064 0.130 847 0.058 0.050 0.099 1405
Cash over Assets 0.07 0.05 0.09 1065 0.07 0.03 0.10 1780
Tobin's Q 1.13 1.05 0.42 294 1.11 1.04 0.40 686
Issued any security in the next year 0.13 0 0.34 1065 0.09 0 0.28 1780
Issued any security in the next 2 years 0.21 0 0.41 1065 0.14 0 0.35 1780
Issued any security in the next 3 years 0.27 0 0.44 1065 0.19 0 0.39 1780
Issued ordinary equity in the next year 0.05 0 0.23 1065 0.04 0 0.19 1780
Issued ordinary equity in the next 2 years 0.10 0 0.30 1065 0.07 0 0.25 1780
Issued ordinary equity in the next 3 years 0.14 0 0.35 1065 0.10 0 0.30 1780
Issued bonds in the next year 0.06 0 0.23 1065 0.03 0 0.17 1780
Issued bonds in the next 2 years 0.11 0 0.31 1065 0.06 0 0.24 1780
Issued bonds in the next 3 years 0.14 0 0.34 1065 0.08 0 0.28 1780
New Tech Firms Old Tech Firms
Table III - Summary Statistics, 1895-1904
Firms are divided into old-tech and new-tech firms. Variables are as defined in Table II.Mean Median s.d. Observations Mean Median s.d. Observations
Board Size 8.38 7 4.67 739 5.77 6 2.87 2106
Firm Age 20.58 14 17.82 739 12.64 9 11.43 2106
London HQ 0.40 0 0.49 739 0.37 0 0.48 2106
Unlisted 0.48 0 0.50 739 0.74 0 0.44 2106
New Technology 0.34 0 0.48 739 0.39 0 0.49 2106
Dividend Payer 0.83 1 0.38 681 0.78 1 0.42 2050
Firm Size (£, millions) 8.61 0.86 21.56 739 0.54 0.21 1.12 2106
Return on Equity 0.079 0.063 0.155 739 0.092 0.078 0.107 2106
Past Growth 0.069 0.053 0.126 567 0.067 0.054 0.107 1685
Cash over Assets 0.06 0.02 0.08 739 0.08 0.04 0.10 2106
Tobin's Q 1.07 1 0.346 385 1.15 1.06 0.44 595
Issued any security in the next year 0.17 0 0.376 739 0.08 0 0.272 2106
Issued any security in the next 2 years 0.26 0 0.440 739 0.13 0 0.341 2106
Issued any security in the next 3 years 0.32 0 0.466 739 0.19 0 0.389 2106
Issued ordinary equity in the next year 0.07 0 0.254 739 0.04 0 0.185 2106
Issued ordinary equity in the next 2 years 0.12 0 0.326 739 0.07 0 0.248 2106
Issued ordinary equity in the next 3 years 0.16 0 0.367 739 0.10 0 0.296 2106
Issued bonds in the next year 0.06 0 0.237 739 0.03 0 0.183 2106
Issued bonds in the next 2 years 0.10 0 0.300 739 0.07 0 0.252 2106
Issued bonds in the next 3 years 0.13 0 0.333 739 0.09 0 0.292 2106
At least one politician on the board No politicians on the board
Firms are divided into those with at least one politician (either an MP or a member of the House of Lords), and those without a 
politician, on their board of directors. Other variables are as defined in Table II.
Table IV - Summary Statistics, 1895-1904Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Log (Firm Size) 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.018*** 0.018** 0.019** 0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log (1 + Firm Age) -0.004 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.027*** -0.027** -0.026** -0.027*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Return on Equity -0.039 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015
(0.059) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.045)
Past Growth 0.336*** 0.250*** 0.242*** 0.251*** 0.330*** 0.283*** 0.279*** 0.288***
(0.076) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Dividend Payer 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.052*** -0.005 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Cash over Assets -0.194 -0.169 -0.149 -0.175 -0.132 -0.110 -0.101 -0.112
(0.120) (0.119) (0.116) (0.117) (0.093) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091)
Past Industry Returns 7.312*** 1.392
(1.680) (2.196)
New Technology 0.031 0.022 -0.005 -0.006 0.055 0.020 0.005 0.031 0.034 0.071
(0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.022) (0.019) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042)
Fraction Politician 0.093 -0.062 -0.134* -0.131* -0.056 0.026 -0.105 -0.064 -0.061 0.008
(0.085) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.090) (0.091) (0.087) (0.082) (0.081) (0.092)
New Tech. * Frac. Politician 0.229 0.220* 0.268** 0.275** 0.031 0.211 0.163 0.097 0.100 0.000
(0.155) (0.133) (0.127) (0.126) (0.155) (0.149) (0.130) (0.122) (0.122) (0.144)
Unlisted -0.078*** -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.021 -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.035
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032)
Unlisted * Frac. Politician -0.264 -0.239
(0.166) (0.165)
Unlisted * New Tech. -0.082** -0.053
(0.028) (0.028)
Unlisted * New Tech. * Frac. Politician 0.604* 0.238
(0.258) (0.259)
Wald Chi
2 11.259 98.838 124.664 179.023 128.765 6.493 77.564 122.843 122.747 128.389
N 2786 2786 2786 2769 2786 2786 2786 2786 2769 2786
Table V - Capital Issues, 1895-1904
We run probit regressions of whether or not firms issued equity or bonds in a public offering in the subsequent 3 years. Log Size is equal to the natural
logarithm of the firm's assets in thousands of dollars. Past industry returns is equal to the equally weighted average return on all other equity securities
in the same industry in the previous year. All other variables are as defined in Table II. All regressions use year fixed effects.
Equity DebtIndustry Dummies No No Yes
New Tech. -0.030 0.001 -0.009
(0.075) (0.057) (0.094)
Log (Firm Size) -0.016 -0.008
(0.021) (0.022)






Log (1 + Board Size) 0.171** 0.174**
(0.071) (0.077)
Fraction Politician -0.374*** -0.287** -0.279**
(0.138) (0.119) (0.117)
New Tech. * Fraction Politician 0.695 0.517 0.568*
(0.475) (0.335) (0.330)
R-squared 0.024 0.325 0.373
Observations 941 941 941
We regress Tobin's Q on the previous year's values of various variables. Both 
specifications use industry and year fixed effects. Variables are as defined in Table II.
Table VI - Tobin's QUncontested





One or more losses, no wins
-0.006
(0.009)
One win, no losses
-0.001
(0.005)





















R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
Observations 392 392 392 31
Contested Elections
Table VII - Event Study Analysis of Electoral Results
The dependent variable is the abnormal return of the firm over a 2-week election window.
One or more wins is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one director was elected in a contested
election and 0 otherwise. One or more losses, no wins equals 1 if all directors who
contested an election lost; one win, no losses equals 1 if only one director contested and
won; one loss, no wins equals 1 if only one director contested and lost; multiple wins
equals 1 if two or more directors were elected in contested elections; multiple losses
equals 1 if two or more directors contested elections and lost; and more wins than losses
equals 1 if more directors won contested elections than lost.